web3.py affected by SSRF via CCIP Read (EIP-3668) OffchainLookup URL handling
28Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. It has a public proof of concept.
ssvc Attendcvss 1.7epss 0.2%
from disclosure to weapon57 days
Published on NVDApr 9
1st PoC+57d
exploitation probability
0.2%top 86% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
1 public exploit(s)
web3.py allows you to interact with the Ethereum blockchain using Python. From 6.0.0b3 to before 7.15.0 and 8.0.0b2, web3.py implements CCIP Read / OffchainLookup (EIP-3668) by performing HTTP requests to URLs supplied by smart contracts in offchain_lookup_payload["urls"]. The implementation uses these contract-supplied URLs directly (after {sender} / {data} template substitution) without any destination validation. CCIP Read is enabled by default (global_ccip_read_enabled = True on all providers), meaning any application using web3.py's .call() method is exposed without explicit opt-in. This results in Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) when web3.py is used in backend services, indexers, APIs, or any environment that performs eth_call / .call() against untrusted or user-supplied contract addresses. A malicious contract can force the web3.py process to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations, including internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.15.0 and 8.0.0b2.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:U
Affected products
ethereum · web3.pypublic PoCs found — 1
githubgithub.com/u1tr0nex/cve-2026-40072-ssrf-lab★ 0⚠ Public resources, to assess the exposure of systems you control or are authorized to test. Test only with authorization.