CVE-2026-45036
Tabby auto-confirms ZMODEM detection on terminal output, leading to shell command execution from displayed file content under fish, bash, and zsh
Vexday Risk Score
21Low
SSVC decision (CISA)
Track
No exploitation signal → monitor
CVSS 7EPSS 0.1%KEV nãoPoC —Nuclei —Metasploit —Patch —
Lifecycle
15 May 2026Published on NVD
Recommendation: Monitor — no exploitation signal at the moment.
Tabby (formerly Terminus) is a highly configurable terminal emulator. Prior to 1.0.233, Tabby before 1.0.233 automatically confirms ZMODEM protocol detection on all terminal session output without user interaction, enabling shell command execution when a user displays attacker-controlled content. The ZModemMiddleware in tabby-terminal consumes all session output through a Zmodem.Sentry, and when a ZMODEM ZRQINIT header is detected, unconditionally calls detection.confirm() and writes a fixed ZRINIT response ( **\x18B0100000023be50\r\n\x11) back into the active PTY as input. When the process that triggered the detection (e.g., cat) exits, the injected bytes are consumed by the user's shell as a command line. Under fish (default configuration), the ** prefix triggers recursive glob expansion against the current directory, allowing an attacker-placed executable at a matching nested path (e.g., d/xB0100000023be50) to be executed by relative pathname without relying on PATH. Under bash and zsh, a secondary xterm.js terminal color-query feedback (OSC 10) can be combined in the same file to inject a slash-containing command word that similarly bypasses PATH resolution. An attacker can exploit this by providing a crafted file (e.g., in a cloned Git repository) that a user displays with cat, achieving code execution with no interaction beyond viewing the file. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.233.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected products
Eugeny · tabbyWant to know if your infrastructure is exposed to this?
Talk to TrueHacking →