CVE-2026-45549
Roxy-WI: Authorization bypass on POST /smon/agent/action/<action> — guest can stop or restart smon-agent on any host
Vexday Risk Score
21Low
SSVC decision (CISA)
Track
No exploitation signal → monitor
CVSS 8.5EPSS 0.2%KEV nãoPoC —Nuclei —Metasploit —Patch —
Lifecycle
10 Jun 2026Published on NVD
Recommendation: Monitor — no exploitation signal at the moment.
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, agent_action (app/routes/smon/agent_routes.py:166-179) has decorators @bp.post('/agent/action/<action>') and @jwt_required() only — no role check, no group ownership check on the server_ip form field. Any authenticated user, including role 4 (guest), can start, stop, or restart the roxy-wi-smon-agent systemd unit on any server they can name. Roxy-WI executes the systemd action over its own SSH credentials (passwordless sudo), so the action runs as root on the target. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:H
Affected products
roxy-wi · roxy-wiWant to know if your infrastructure is exposed to this?
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