Bluetooth: btmtk: validate WMT event SKB length before struct access
3Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. No public exploitation artifact known so far.
ssvc Trackepss 0.1%
exploitation probability
0.1%top 97% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btmtk: validate WMT event SKB length before struct access
btmtk_usb_hci_wmt_sync() casts the WMT event response SKB data to
struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt (7 bytes) and struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt_funcc
(9 bytes) without first checking that the SKB contains enough data.
A short firmware response causes out-of-bounds reads from SKB tailroom.
Use skb_pull_data() to validate and advance past the base WMT event
header. For the FUNC_CTRL case, pull the additional status field bytes
before accessing them.
Affected products
Linux · LinuxReferences
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36c85f7029484d5ede769f8873d16e9c8e35533chttps://git.kernel.org/stable/c/624fb79dadc1b65757986a9d0fdde5c0cf3fe179https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/634a4408c0615c523cf7531790f4f14a422b9206https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70d37a8b9229e394cc17ddad47e90b81d80fcd09https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c411cf1bfde951cfa821809cf4020ba177f76e0c