Docker Model Runner container-to-host code execution via MLX-LM model_file importlib loading
41Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. It has a public proof of concept.
ssvc Attendcvss 8.8epss 0.2%
from disclosure to weapon0 days
Published on NVDMay 22
1st PoCMay 20
exploitation probability
0.2%top 87% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
1 public exploit(s)
The MLX inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS uses the MLX-LM library, which unconditionally imports and executes arbitrary Python files from model directories via the model_file configuration field in config.json. When a model's config.json specifies a model_file pointing to a Python file, MLX-LM uses importlib to load and execute it with no trust_remote_code gate or equivalent safety check. The MLX backend runs without sandboxing, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the Docker host as the Docker Desktop user.
Any container on the Docker network can trigger this by calling the model-runner.docker.internal API to pull a malicious model from an attacker-controlled OCI registry and request inference.
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Affected products
Docker · Docker Desktoppublic PoCs found — 1
githubgithub.com/davidrxchester/CVE-2026-5843★ 0⚠ Public resources, to assess the exposure of systems you control or are authorized to test. Test only with authorization.