Zalktis: SQL injection via partner-controlled fields in imported e-invoices
41Vexday Risk Score
No sign of exploitation. It has a public proof of concept.
ssvc Attendcvss 8.7epss 0.3%
exploitation probability
0.3%top 76% of all CVEs
observed exploitation
nono source reports it
1 public exploit(s)
SQL injection in the Zalktis accounting application via
trading-partner-controlled text fields in received electronic invoices. When
importing a received e-invoice (UBL/PEPPOL) or an e-commerce export, Zalktis
concatenates partner-controlled values directly into SQL statement text using
string concatenation, with neither parameterised queries nor escaping. The
application's own escaping helper, Dazadi.sql_txt(),
is not invoked on these code paths, so a party that sends an invoice can break
out of the string literal and alter the query logic.
This issue affects Zalktis: before 2026.1.586 and before 2026.2.592.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Affected products
Zalktis Programmas (SIA "Zalktis Programmas") · Zalktispublic PoCs found — 1
cve_referenceoffseq.com/en/research/zalktis-cve-2026-59109/unverified⚠ Public resources, to assess the exposure of systems you control or are authorized to test. Test only with authorization.